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PREFATORY STATEMENT
SCM's statement that the "Facts have been mischaracterized" by Appellant is simply untrue.

The facts

cited in Appellant's brief are accurate and uncontested and
conclusively establish the basis for the two crucial questions
in this case -- (1) Was Fischer's 1979 promise to Watkins &
Faber for adjacent office space consideration for the signing
0f the written 1979 lease?, and, if so,

(2)

Does Watkins

&

Faber have any remedy for SCM's refusal to keep the promise?
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS DOES NOT PREVENT
RESCISSION FOR REFUSAL OF THE PROMISE.
SC!l's brief emphasizes the Statute of Frauds and
~riues
·~e

that there was not an enforceable oral contract for

1djacent space, and therefore, Watkins & Faber has no
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remedy whatever.

Even assu1'11

1 ;_- ; 1 1;-r,,-::'f'. t

that the oral promise for the acl) ,"icen t

sµace

c~u

2 d c.o t

be specifically enforced because it was not in writing,
there is no doubt that the promise was made and that it was
specifically made to induce Watkins & Faber to sign the
written lease of July 9, 1979.

If, as SCM argues, Fischer's

promise was meaningless, then in fairness the 1979 lease
which would not have existed but for the promise should also
be just as meaningless.

Contrary to SCM's position that the

promise had no value, it is undisputed that it had sufficient
value to cause the 1979 lease to be signed.
Because the promise induced Watkins & Faber to
sign the 1979 lease, it should not be isolated as an

independe~

transaction which might be unenforceable under the Statute
of Frauds.

Where valuable consideration was specifically

given to obtain the promise, that consideration should be
returned or cancelled if the promise is deemed not enforceable because of the Statute of Frauds.

If SCM cannot be

forced to enter into a lease agreement for the adjacent space,
then Watkins & Faber should not be forced to continue performance under the 1979 renewal lease.

The Restatement of

Contracts, Second, endorses legal principles applicable to
this case.

Section 141 states as follows:
§141.

Action for Value of Performance Under
Unenforceable Contract.
-2-

(1)
In an action for the value of
performance under a contract, except as stated
u1 Subsection (2), the Statute of Frauds does
not invalidate any defense which would be available if the contract were enforceable against
both parties.
(2)
Vlhere a party to a contract which is
unenforceable against him refuses either to
perform the contract or to sign a sufficient
memorandum, the other party is justified in suspending any performance for which he has not
already received the agreed return, and such a
suspension is not a defense in an action for
the value of performance rendered before the
suspension.
[Emphasis added.]
The Statute of Frauds does not invalidate the
defense of failure of consideration.

Because SCM failed

to provide the promised adjacent office space, Watkins &
Faber was justified in suspending any further performance
under the lease.
Another provision of the Restatement of Contracts,
Second, Section 139, directs itself to specific enforcement
of oral promises.

Even though Watkins & Faber is not seeking

specific performance, the section emphasizes the principle
that the Statute of Frauds will not be applied where injustice
will occur.

Section 139 states as follows:

§139.

Enforcement by Virtue of Action in
Reliance.

(1)
A promise which the promiser should
reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance
on the part of the promisee or a third person and
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(2)
In deter~1n1r1? \~he~her 1nj~st1·;= ~3~ b~
avoided onJy b~· en~~rceme~t ~~ :~1e pr~m1s~, :~~
follo<-·ing circuf'istances are sic;n1 :icant:

la)
the availabilit·· and a~ecuacy ~:
other remedies, particularly cancellation
and restitution;
(b)
the definite and substantial character of the action or forbearance in relation
to the remedy sought;
(c)
the extent to which the action or
forbearance corroborates evidence of the
making and terms of the promise, or the making
and terms are otherwise established by clear
and convincing evidence;

Id)
the reasonableness of the action or
forbearance;
(e)
the extent to which the action or
forbearance was foreseeable by the promiser.
One factor in determinina whether

in~ust1ce

can be

avoided only by enforcement of the promise is t:'1e a"ailability or adequacy of :ther remedies, particularly cancellation.

adjacent space

~~as

tn2 ·Jnly reason

their lease in 1979.

~a~k1r1s

paid rent until SC:l r-e:c_isec
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the building because the failure of the

,,romis<= Justified suspension of performance under the
lease and cancellation of said lease.

It would be unjust

to hold Watkins & Faber to a lease which would never have
been signed but for

the promise which SCM refused to honor.

POINT II.
SCM IS NOT ENTITLED TO RELY ON
THE RECORDING ACT.
SCM argued to the lower court that it was a bona
fide purchaser under the recording act and has advanced
that argument in its brief.

The lower court ruled that

the recording act was not applicable because Watkins & Faber
was not attempting to enforce the oral promise for adjacent
space.

Even assuming for purposes of argument that the

recording act applies to the oral promise given as consideration for signing the 1979 renewal lease, in truth SCM
'"as not a bona fide purchaser because it knowingly assumed
the risk of claims and liabilities arising as a result of
SCM's later actions which conflicted with prior unwritten
tenant obligations.

SCM's own purchase documents with

Fischer show that SCM considered the possibility of unwritten obligations to tenants.

For the purpose of showing

that SCM considered the risk and knowingly incurred some
!1ab1lity to tenants under the purchase agreement with Fischer,

-5-

SCM and Fischer.

1 R-197).

the Exchange Agreement, Exhibit 40,

paragra~n

6

~f

which

states as follows:
Indemnification.
Company hereby agrees to
indemnify and hold Fischer harmless from and
against all claims and liabilities arising out
of the ownership, operation and management of the
Fischer Property from and after the Fischer
Property Transfer Date.
On the other side, the lower court admitted the Assignment
of the Tenant Leases, Exhibit lP, paragraph 2 of which
states as follows:
It is expressly agreed that Assignee
shall have no authority or duty to negotiate,
compromise or settle any unwritten obligations of
Assignor.
By the above wording, SCM acknowledged the possibility of
unwritten obligations to tenants.

The lower court erred

by not admitting the Exchange Agreement because after SCM
purchased the building, SCM entered into a long-term lease
with IML thereby preventing fulfillment of the 1979 promise
of adjacent space, an unwritten obligation to Appellant.
The Assignment of Tenant Leases provides that

SC~

authority or duty to negotiate, compromise

settle the

~r

had no

lessor's unwritten obligations, but it cL=arly dces :10t
relieve SCM from liability fer SCM's own actions thereafter
which interferred with one sue:--. un·.vritten "enar."
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·cbl~1ati•c:1.

By virtue of the Exchange Agreement, SCM specifically

assumed all liability for SCM's actions which might have
compromised unwritten obligations whose performance had not
taken place.

It is obvious from the wording of the two

documents that SCM considered that its act_§ffOn could
conflict with unwritten obligations Fischer owed to Newhouse
tenants.

Nevertheless, SCM consciously chose not to

inquire of the Newhouse tenants, including Appellant, before
it purchased the Newhouse Building and gave IML a long-term
lease on the sixth floor.
SCM's long-term lease of the sixth floor to IML
conflicted with the unwritten promise of additional space
to Appellant.

Since SCM expressly assumed responsibility

for its actions and was not a bona fide purchaser, it
should not be allowed to deny the promise and prevent
termination of the 1979 lease.
CONCLUSION
The Statute of Frauds does not invalidate
Appellant's defense of failure of consideration.
Even if the recording act were applicable to this
situation, SCM is not a bona fide purchaser.

The promise of

adjacent office space was consideration for signing the 1979
renewal lease.

It would be unjust to hold Watkins & Faber
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to a lease which would never have been si;ned but c_:cr tl:cc
promise of adjacent space and deny any relief

~hatever

far

failure of the promise.
Respectfully submitted this 19th day of October,
1983.
WATKINS

By

&

FABER

Brian W. Burnett
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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